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The prime objective of this thesis is to review some
important aspects of first -order logic and different
methods of reasoning in order to show a possible way of
achieving a part of common sense knowledge in a computer.
Common sense reasoning differs from first-order logic
in the need to draw conclusions from partial and changing
knowledge. In logic, a conclusion is not accepted unless
it can be proved according to the rules of inference, but
in real life, conclusions without a proof are accepted
because they seem plausible. Thus, something more power
ful than logic is needed.
Two of the most outstanding researchers in Artificial
Intelligence, J. McCarthy and M. Minsky, disagree on how
to achieve common sense in a computer. McCarthy [ 19303
believes that the solution lies in designing computer pro
grams to reason according to mathematical logic, whether
or not that is the way people think. The major alterna
tive is a psychological approach called the Frame System
developed by Minsky 1 19753.
First-order logic began to show its usefulness as a
knowledge representation scheme as a result of research
into mechanical theorem proving. Concern has been
expressed, however, about the lack in logic of an explicit
scheme for indexing relevant knowledge, its incompetence
in dealing with incomplete and changing knowledge, and the
limitations of deductive rnonotonic inference.
Frames represent a way to organize knowledge by
breaking it into highly modular pieces. Frames ar^e very
useful in representing knowledge of stereotypical concepts
or situations, analyses of visual perceptions, means of
reasoning, etc.
The organization of this thesis centers on adapta
tions of logic and frames to common sense reasoning.
Chapter two shows the basic characteristics of common
sense reasoning. Chapter three traces the historical
development of logic and reviews its basic principles.
Chapter four describes several ways to achieve common
sense reasoning through the use of non-rnonotonic logic and
circumscription, and through the Frame System. Chapter
five explains how ar\ application of
non
rnonotonic logic
works, giving its functional description and explaining a
simple example.
. 0 Logical Reasoning
!=2aiesl 3gssoni.ng is the method whereby propositions
of a system are derived from postulates. The principles of
logical reasoning are based upon evident
'canons'
of logi
cal procedure. A B122B22i.ti.on is a statement which can be
either true or false, and that can be asserted or denied.
A E22tyi^IiS is a proposition or statement whose truth is
taken for granted, or is self-evident. A postulate meets
the following criteria: coherence, belonging to the sys
tem; contribut i veness, having consequences in the system;
consistency, not contradicting any other implied postulate
or proposition; and, independency, not being itself
implied by any other postulate or group of postulates.
Logical reasoning is the method of following rules of
inference in the manipulation of the premises, which are
the statements that constitute the starting point of an
inference -statements which express a belief. Reasoning
is logical if the inference rules are sound and if they
are applied correctly. The fact that a line of reasoning
is logical does not imply its correctness or truth; a line
of reasoning will be true and correct only if the reason
ing is logical and the premises are true and correct. In
other words, if
true' terms are manipulated according to
the rules, the result will be correct and true. Logic,
then, is concerned with consistency, not with value
j udgernents.
2. 1 Principles of Logical Procedure
The following principles define an algebra of Logic
as a series of theorems. A theorem is defined to be a
statement containing nothing that cannot be proved. It
must be entirely implied by propositions other than
itself, and it may contain no assumptions not made in the
postulates.
2.1.1 Principle of Identity
This principle asserts that if any statement is true,
then it is true. It dictates that every statement of the
form pap is true, that is, that every such statement is a
tautology.
2.1.2 Principle of Contradiction
This principle asserts that no statement can be both
true and false. It dictates that every statement of the
form p
'"
""p is false; that is, that every such statement
is self-contradictory.
2.1.3 Principle of Excluded Middle
This principle asserts that any statement is either
true or false. It dictates that every statement of the
form p v ~p is true; that is, that every such statement is
a tautology.
2.1.4 Principle of Substitution
This principle asserts that identical terms may be
substituted for one another; therefore, if x is equal to
y, then x plus y may be substituted for y plus z.
Similarly, equivalent propositions may be substituted
for one another. This is expressed as follows: if a -9 b
== (a+b = b) , then <a+b
= b) may be substituted for (a^b)
, and vice versa.
2.1.5 Principle of Application
This principle asserts that a statement about a part,
applies to the whole. For example, if it is granted that
a+b = b+a, and if it is known that a certain element x and
a certain element y exist, then it is true of this x and
this y, that x+y
= y+x.
2.1.6 Principle of Inference
A proposition that may be asserted assures that any
proposition thereby implied may also be asserted. Thus,
if (a= ~b> and <a= ~b> <b= ""a), then it may be asserted
thereafter that ( b= ^a) is an independent proposition.
This principle makes possible the process of passing
from given premises to inferred conclusions, that is, the
process of deductive reasoning.
2.2 Rules of Manipulation
The following rules are characteristic of the algebra
of logic, and they provide means for substituting
equivalent propositions. The ability of interchangeaDle
forms is the central requirement for a deductive system.
Some of these rules are
2. . 1 Commutative Law
The Commutative law dictates the equivalency between









. . Distributive Law
The distributive law consists of two parts; the first
is related to the disjunction of an element to a conjunc
tion, and the second , concerns the conjunction of ar\ ele
ment with a disjunction. P is disjuncted to a conjunction
q
's
r by distributing its value to each member of the con







larly, p is conjuncted to q
rt
r, distributing its value to
each member of the disjunction. Thus, p
"
(q v r) == (p v
q )
's
( p v r ) .
. . 3 De Morgan' s Laws
There are two logical equivalences that express the
interrelationship among conjunction, disjunction, and
negation. Since the disjunction (p v q> asserts that at
least one of its two disjuncts is true, it is not contrad
icted by asserting that at least one is false, but only by
asserting that both are false. Thus asserting the nega
tion of the disjunction (p v q) is equivalent to asserting
the conjunction of the negation of p and q, that is, ~(p v
q) == (~p
-*
~q). Similarly, since asserting the conjunc
tion of p and q assserts that
both are true, to contradict
this, it is needed to assert that at least one is false.





equivalent to asserting the disjunction of the negation of
p and of q, that is, ~(p
"
q) == <~p v ~q). These two
tautologies are known as De Morgan's theorems.
De Morgan's theorems can be given a combined formula
tion as: The negation of the disjunction/ conjunction of
two statements is equivalent to the conjunction/ disjunc
tion of the negations of the two statements.
As a result of this, any disjunction may also be
formed by conjunction and negation; and any conjunction
may also be formed by disjunction and negation.
The exact relation between disjunction and conjunc
tion is shown by these two laws





q) == ~p v ~q
The previous laws can be represented graphically by
the following ^erm Diagrams
(p v q) == ~p
-'
~q (p q)
== ~p v ^'q
Both Theorems are of great significance because they
permit any conjunction to be written in the form of a dis
junction and vice versa. It follows then, that all laws
applying to disjunctions also apply to conjunctions, and
vice versa.
Since disjunctions are expressed as conjunctions and
vice versa, substitutions may be done whenever convenient,
a very important tool for designing circuits and simplify
ing arguments.
.3 Postulates as Formal Definition of Relations
If a universe K of unspecified elements x,y, .... is
considered, and an unspecified relation r exists among the
elements of K, a number of abstract propositions called
postulates determine all that is known about either K or
r. In other words, the postulates determine the kind of
relation r can be, and how r operates on the elements of
K.
The possible meanings of r are restricted to rela
tions that
"behave"
like r, where the behavior of r is
specified by the postulates. Thus, the postulates consti
tute a formal definition of r, which means that the pro
perties of a certain type of relation are known, that the
symbol r stands for this type of relation rather for a
10
specific relation, and that it may be interpreted to mean
any concrete relation of the given type.
Working with logical concepts, such as relations, and
propositions, involves dealing with kinds of constituent
relations, and with kinds of systems rather than with the
systems themselves. In other words, logical concepts deal
with abstract patterns rather than with concrete things.
Abstract patterns have the advantage of being applicable
to many concrete things.
The postulates that define a relation, must describe
the properties of that relation. These postulates or
primitive propositions can be expressed symbolically, and,
taken together, they constitute a formal definition of a
relation in some universe. The following set of properties
define an important class of relations
1. Irref lexiveness:
The relation r is said to be irref if no ele
ment of x is in the same relation r to any other element
of x. As example, let r stand for the relation "taller
than". If r(a, b) means "a is taller than b", then r(a,a)
is not possible, i.e., a cannot be taller than itself.
11
. Transitivity:
The relation r is said to be transitive if x is in
relation r to z, as a result of being x in relation r to
y, and y in the same relation r to z. Following the pre
vious example, if a is taller than b and b is taller than
c, then a is taller than c.
3. Asymmetry:
The relation r is said to be assymetric. if x is in
relation r to y, but y is not to x. Thus, continuing with
the same example, if a is taller than b, b cannot be
taller than a.
4. Connexity:
The relation r is said to be connexi.ye if x is in
relation r to y, or y in relation r to x, but not both
relations can happen simultaneously. Concluding with the
example, a may be taller than b,
"or"
b taller than a, but
a may not be taller than b
"and"
b taller than a, where a
and b are different.
The previous rules designate relations of great
importance in the formulation of an algebra.
1
3.0 The Algebra of Logic
Logic is the discipline concerned with making gen
eralizations and abstractions by a system of orderly
thinking. To do this, logic deals with two processes of
reasoning, induction and deduction.
i.Dd.yi.i2D is the process of reasoning from general
observations to specific truths. It is also known as
'probable inference'. In inductive reasoning, the evi
dence is not supposed to support the conclusion with logi
cal necessity, but only to support it with a definite
positive degree of probability. That is, inductive argu
ments are intended to support their conclusions with pro
bability only, because it is possible that the premises of
an inductive argument could be true while its conclusion
is false.
Deduction is the process of reasoning from specific
truths to general principles. Deductive reasoning is also
known as 'formal inference'. In deductive reasoning, the
conclusion is supposed to be necessarily implied by the
premises; it is more reliable
because a valid deduction
holds by necessity. A deductive system is a system wherein
a small number of propositions or postulates determines
all other propositions.
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To illustrate a deductive system, Boolean Algebra
will be examined in the next section of this chapter, not
only because it constitutes a good example in computer
science and logic design, but because it was also the
first attempt to formalize the principles of logic as an
algebra.
The second section of this chapter deals with prepo
sitional calculus, which provides a means for operating on
propositions or statements by logical combinations. Thus,
new statements can be deduced from an initial set of pro-
posit ions.
The last section examines predicate calculus, which
handles propositions in more detail and allows some
analysis of the inner structures of propositions.
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to show how
reasoning is achieved in
classical or rnonotonic logic.
This will serve as a "base
line"
for the comparison with
non-monotonic logic to follow in chapters four and five.
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3.1 Historical Review of Logic
The need for finding a general method of solving log
ical problems was satisfied with the development of an
algebra of Logic. In 1847 George Boole invented the first
workable algebra that obeyed the principles of logic. The
theory of Boolean algebra was called "Algebra of
Logic"
in
Boole's treatise "An investigation of the Laws of
Thought"
C 18473, hence the name of this chapter.
The history of logic has two peculiarities that dis
tinguish it from other disciplines. First, formal logic
was created by Aristotle virtually out of nothing. Second,
for over two thousand years this subject matter was
believed to have been exhausted by its creator.
Although the history of formal logic begins with
Aristotle whose thinking has had a profund influence
throughout the world, logical thinking was known before
his time. There is proof of this in the Golenishev
Papyrus written by an unknown Egyptian priest C*3, and in
the Rhind Papyrus written by
A' h Mose C*3. There also is
evidence that the Babylonians knew logical procedures 1*1.
The logic of Aristotle, with its rules of syllogisms,
defined the elementary processes for all reasoning. A
* See Alice M. Hilton C 19633, Ch. 1
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syllogism is a deductive argument in which a conclusion is
'mediately'
inferred from two premises. It is mediate
inference because the conclusion is supposed to be drawn
from the first premise through the mediation' of the
second. Syllogisms will be explained in 3.3.3
Many contributions to logic were made between
Aristotle's time and the nineteenth century. One excep
tional contributor was Gottfried Wilhem von Leibnitz
C 16663, who created a precise symbolic language reflecting
the structure of thinking. Another important contributor
was Immnanuel Kant CI 78 13 who introduced the principles of
inductive reasoning.
John S. Mill C 18433 made a profound contribution to
inductive logic and introduced the distinction between
connotation and denotation. August De Morgan C18473 also
quantified the predicate. In addition, he also made
several studies in
nontrad it ional modes of inference. G.
Boole C 18473 invented a method to deal in an easier way
with syllogisms and also invented his famous algebra. W.
Hamilton's C185E3 "Quantification of the
Predicate"
sug
gested a way of dealing with
propositions as equations of
terms. This quantification constituted the basis of what
is currently known as
predicate calculus.
16
The algebra of classes was developed by many logi
cians, among them, W. Jevons C18743, who solved several







interpretation. J. \Jenn C 13763 and C. Pei rce CI 3733
adopted Jevons' s interpretation and eliminated the opera
tions of subtraction and division in the Boolean Algebra.
Venn, particularly, developed a spatial representation for
proposit ional Logic. Peirce and E. Schroder C 19093
developed the logic of propositions, proposit ional func
tions and relations.
G. Frege C18933 is considered the founder of modern
logic because he was the first to describe the preposi
tional calculus in its modern form. He also was the first
to introduce the notion of a prepositional function, the
use of quantifiers, and the logical analysis of proof by
mathematical induction.
By the end of the nineteenth century Giuseppe Peano
C 1895-19083 greatly increased the range of symbolic logic
by introducing symbols for other logical notions such as
"is contained in", "there exists", "is a", etc., symbols
which were later adopted by Russell and Whitehead.
Between 1910 and 1913, B. Russell and A. Whitehead
developed their Principia Mathematica in which they
incor-
17
porated most of mathematics into a logistic development.
They also created a calculus of relations.
Paradoxes have always played a vital role in logic
and philosophy. They help to delineate the boundaries of
individual knowledge and human comprehension. One of the
most interesting paradox is Zeno of
Elea'
s paradox about
motion C+3 . It presents three problems: infinitesimal,
infinity, and continuity. The first problem was solved by
K. Weirstrass C**3 . The solutions of the other two were
proposed by R. Dedekind C**3. G. Cantor C19153 solved
these two problems. Another important contributor to
logic is L. von Wittgenstein C19533 who invented truth
tables.
The purpose if this brief history is to give a feel
for the long tradition of logic in western civilizations.
The
"stretching"
of logic to fit common sense problems is
the latest in a long line of work aimed at coming up with
a formalization for knowledge.
** See R. Mattesich C19733, Ch. 3
+ Suppose a race between the fleet-footed Achilles and a
tortoise. Achilles is given a handicap of one hundred me
ters. The gun indicating the start of the race is shot at
time T. When Achilles reaches the starting point
of the
tortoise, at time T
+ Tl, the tortoise is not there, having
moved a short distance
beyond. Achilles continues in pur
suit of the tortoise, and at time T
+ Tl + T comes to the
place the tortoise was at T
+ Tl. The tortoise is not
there. Achilles continues in
pursuit and so on, and on.




A 22lsD algebra is a tuple <B, 0> , where:
B: is a non-empty set.
0, 1 B, where 0 =1= 1.
0: is a set containing three operations




BxB > B. It isa binary operation called con
junct ion.
~: B -> B. It is a unary operation called negation or
complement.
The operations v and
'"
are characterized by the following
identities which are satisfied for all x, y, and z e B.















c) Association: (x v y) v z










d> Distribution: x v (y
"





( y v z )
= ( x
rt




e) Absorption: x v (x - y) = x
x
"
(x v y) = x.





















This algebra has the following characteristics.
If there is a class of elements x and a class of ele
ments y, disjunction forms a class composed of elements x
"or"
elements y, or both. A class is a collection of
objects which are identified by some means or some proper
characteristic which its members have.
If there is a class of elements x and a class of ele
ments y, conjunction




Negation means that if there is a class of elements
x, then there is also a class of elements not x.
The laws of idempotency imply synthesis; that is, if
both elements are equal, it is the same to consider one,
or the other, or both.
The laws of commutation mean that a sequential change
does not affect either disjunction or conjunction. They
were also explained in chapter two.
The laws of association mean that disjunction and
conjunction are not affected by the ordering of the ele
ments.
The laws of distribution imply that the disjunction
of an element with a conjunction is achieved by distribut
ing this element with each element of the conjunction.
Similarly, the conjunction of an element with a disjunc
tion means that this element is distributed with each ele
ment of the disjunction. In chapter two they were also
described.
The laws of absorption are the result of combining
the laws of idempotency and distribution
G iven x v ( x
-"
y >
= ( x v x ) ( x v y ) ,
since (x v x) = x
then x (x v y)
= x.
21
Similarly for the product
G iven x
"






then x v ( x
"
y) = x.
The truth value of x, 0 or 1 , alone determines tne
truth value of the entire expression.
The laws of universe class state that the truth value
of the disjunction of x and the universe is always 1, and
the truth value of the conjunction is x.
If x=0: 0vl = l, 0
"
1 = 0 ; and
if x=l: 1 v 1 = 1, 1
~
1 = 1.
Similarly, the laws of null class state that the
truth value of the disjunction of x and the null class is
x, and the truth value of the
conjunction is 0.
If x=0: 0 v 0 = 0, 0
-
0 = 0 ; and
if x= l: 1 v 0 = 1, 1
A
0 = 0.
The laws of complement assert that x, or its comple
ment, or both, form the
universe and that the conjunction
of x with its complement is the null class.
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The laws of De Morgan were discussed in chapter two.
Finally, the law of involution is obvious; it dic
tates that the complement of the complement of x is x.
It is important to see the concept of Boolean Algebra
as a calculus of proposit ional functions, and not only as
a calculus of classes. Propositions can either be true or
false, 1 or 0 respectively.
Regardless of how different two propositions seem,
they are equivalent if they have the same truth values,
and if this occurs, their negations have the same truth
values too. The important issue for the calculus is the
condition of truth and falsehood, and not what is true or
false. The calculus of logical relations shows the formal
properties of logical relations but does not sanction




EC2E2s.ii2nai calculus is a method for calculating
with propositions that are either true or false, by com
bining them and deducing other propositions from thern.
These sentences are treated in an abstract way, so that,
if
"p"
denotes a proposition, there is no interest in
knowing what
"p"
means, but rather what happens if
"p"
is
a true or a false proposition.
A =i[QBie =ti.ment is one which does not contain any
other statement as a component, for example, "This is
logic". A compound statement is one which contains
another statement as a component. The other statement may
be compound too. Examples are "A city of Italy is Rome or
a city of Spain is Seville", "If you break it, then you
pay it", etc.
The first kind of compound statement to consider is
conjunctive compound statements. The conjunction of two




a) Alice is a girl and lives in Wonderland.
p: Alice is a girl.
q: Alice lives in wonderland.
4
Conjunctive statements are true if and only if both
constituent statements are true.




b) Tomorrow is Friday or Saturday.
p: Tomorrow is Friday.
q: Tomorrow is Saturday.
p v q
Disjunctive statements are false if and only if both
constituent statements are false, otherwise, they are
true.
The negation of a statement is formed by inserting a
"not"
into the original statement. Negative statements are
true if and only if what is negated is false. As an exam
ple consider the following compound statement.
c) To be or not to be. . . .
p: To be
D ~p
This example shows a special case of disjunction.
The statement can be represented logically as (p v "-p) ,
25





one. (p v "*p) is true if one or both





at the same time. If the disjunc
tion is represented as (p ""p) , which is a mutually
exclusive "or", then to be true, only one and not both of
its disjunctives may be true at a time. That is precisely
Shakespeare'
s idea.
Conditional statements are formed by placing an
"if"
before the first statement and inserting a
"then"
between




is called the "antecedent", and the statement after
the
"then"
is called the "consequent". In other words,
conditional statement asserts that its antecedent implies
its consequence. An example is.
d) If I think, then I am.
p: I think
q : I am
p * q
ar wording for this is "I think,
there-
ergo sum) .
Conditional statements are false only when the conse
quent is false, and true
otherwise. The conditional
26
statement p q, then, is equivalent to (~p v q).
These are the most important connectives since the
other commonly used can be defined in terms of these.
3.3.1 Well-Formed Formulas
The first step in problem solving is to observe and
identify relevant data, that is, to represent knowledge in
the language of the logical system. This language
describes strings of symbols that are composed according
to certain grammatical rules. These strings are called
the weii-formed f2C[QMls= ?
01"
wf f ' s, of the logic. The
rules would, for example, accept such an expression as '""p
v q", but would not permit an expression like "p q v ^"'.
The wff ' s, then, are those symbol strings that make sense
grammat ical ly.
It is necessary to prove both theorems about the










Certain symbols within the language have already been
introduced, such as those representing the logical connec
tives. In addition, the parenthesis and proposit ional
variables like p, q, r, etc. have been introduced. Within
7
the metalanguage, the letters A, B, C, etc. denote
entire
well-formed formulas. Thus, (A) v (B) , for example,
is an
expression which denotes any desired member of
the class
of formulas obtained by substituting expressions for
the
letters A and B.
A formal definition of a wff is the following:
a) A proposit ional variable is a wff.
b) If A is a wff, ~(A) is a wff.
c) If A and B are wff's then any logical connection
of them is a wff.
d) A symbol string is wff if and only if
it is pro






== <q>> is a wff.




A2: p is a
wff
B2: ~(q) is a wff
Bl: <A3) == <B3)
A3: ~(A4)
A4: ~(p) is a wff
B3: q is a






(p) v (r) )
is not a wff.




A: p a wff.




:. A is not a wff because Bl has 3 elements
instead of , contradicting part c) of the definition.
3.3.2 Truth Tables
The truth value of an expression depends on those
values that its variables may take. An expression with n
n
variables represents a function of elements which may
be represented in a truth table. Thus, a truth table
shows the truth values of a wff for each assignment to its
variables. As an example, consider the following expres
sion (p
"







q (1) P v ~r (2) (1) O (2)
t t
1
t 1 t t t
t t f 1 t t t
t f t 1 f t t
t f f 1 f t t
f t t 1 f f t
f t f 1 f t t
f f t 1 f f t
f f f 1 f t t
A compressed truth table of the same expression is
p q r p
"







If the result of the truth table for any assignment
of values is true, it is called a tautology. If the
expression always takes the false value, it is called a
contradiction. If the final value depends on the assign
ment of truth values to the variables, the expression is
called a contingency.
Two propositions are equivalent if both have the same
truth tables. One method for proving theorems, then, is
through truth tables by examining all possible combina
tions for both propositions. This method works but is
inefficient because if n variables occur in the premises,
n
then two tables, each with 2 rows must be examined.
30
3. 3. 3 Methods of Proof
A syllogistic argument, or syllogism, is an argument
consisting of three propositions, the first two being the
premises and the third, the conclusion or theorem. This
kind of argument is also called "inference
schema"
and is
valid if the premises are accepted as true, and the con




which is equivalent to -C (premise 1)
"
(premise 2) > J con
clusion. In other words, the antecedent is formed by the
conjunction of the premises and the consequent is the con









:. ^q v p
This kind of argument represents the most common way
of reasoning, and
there are several methods to prove the
validity of
such an argument, including the following.
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3.3.3.1 Rules of Inference and Equivalence
As was mentioned above, truth tables are not a good
method for testing the validity of an argument because of
the inefficiency of exhaustively examining all the rows of
the table. A more efficient way is to infer the conclu
sion of an argument from its premises by a sequence of
substitutions of valid elementary arguments. The process
of substitution means to substitute statements for state
ment variables and not statements for statements. The







3. Hypothetical Syllogism 4. Disjunctive Syllogism
p P q
q P r























:. p v q
Many arguments cannot be proved using only the previ
ous rules of inference; additional rules are required.
These new rules are logical equivalences, i.e., they
replace a statement by another one having the same truth
value according to the following tautologies:
10. De Morgan' s Theorem
~(p
A
q) == (^p v ~q)












< p v (q v r) >






























== <~q 9 ~p)
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16. Material Implication
<p O q) == (~p v q)
17. Tautology
p






(p == q) == -C (p q)
"
(q P p) >








q) & r) > == {p ^ (q r> >
Taken together these lists constitute a complete sys
tem because they permit the construction of a formal proof
for any truth argument. The first nine rules can be
applied only to whole lines of a proof and the last ten,
can be applied either to whole lines or to parts of the
lines. Several of these rules were included in the Boolean
Algebra.
Example:




o > ^ p















n) > => p
5) q => p
S) ~q v p
Cornmutat ion ( 1 )
Association (3)
Hi pothet ical Syllogism (2,4)
Material Implication (5)
3.3.3.2 Invalidity
If formal attempts to prove the validity of an argu
ment fail, this does not mean that the validity of the
argument cannot be proved by other means neither that the
argument is invalid. The method of invalidity is closely
related to truth tables, but is shorter.
An argument is invalid if a single case can be found
in which truth values are assigned to the variables in
such a way that the premises are true and the conclusion
is false. Assigning truth values to the variables such
that the premises are true and the conclusion false is
sufficient to prove the invalidity of an argument. This
kind of assignment is equivalent to the one done by truth
tables, but it is
shorter. Consequently, it is not neces
sary to
examine all rows in a truth table to prove the
3b
invalidity of an argument; it is sufficient to find only













. : (~q v p) ^ ~p
Assigning T to rn, n, o, and p, and assigning F to a,
the premises become true. Following these assignments the
conclusion is false. Since the conclusion is false, tne
argument is invalid. Expanding the previous example.
<(rn^n)^o>^p T
T T T T





F T T T




An argument is valid if its premises are mutually
inconsistent. If a truth table is constructed for such an
argument, it will show that in every row, at least one of
the premises is false. In other words, there is no row in
which all the premises are all true and the conclusion
false, hence, the truth table establishes the validity of
the argument.
The case of inconsistency is an attempt to negate the
principle of contradiction (see . l.). The real problem
with inconsistencies is that any and every conclusion fol
lows logically from inconsistent premises.
Example:
1) a 9 b
2) "-a 9 c
3) "Mb v c)
. : d
This argument is valid, because its variables are
inconsistent. The inconstency is shown in variables a and
b, because both are
affirmed in premise 1, and both are
negated in premises and 3. The conclusion d is vacu
ously true, since it
follows from inconsistent premises.
3.3.3.4 Prepositional Resolution
F.C2E2sitionai rgsoiutign is an iterative process of
proof which at each step compares or resolves two clauses
yielding a new clause inferred from them. Proposit
ional
Resolution produces proofs by refutation. That is, to
prove a theorem it attempts to show that the negation of
the theorem produces a contradiction with the known prem
ises.
Before explaining how this process works,
it is
necessary to define some new
concepts. The conjunctive
form of a proposition is one in which negation symbols
apply only to
variables and not to parenthesized expres
sions, and
'or'
symbols connect only variables and not
parenthesized expressions. A giause , then, is a simple
wff or a wff in conjunctive form.
The resolution procedure says
a) Convert all premises and the
negation of the
theorem to clause form.
b) Select two clauses
that contain a variable and
its negation.
c) Generate a new
clause containing all the 'or'-ed
elements of the selected
clauses except for the variable
chosen and its negation.
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d) Continue the process until it either leads to a
contradiction, in which case the theorem is proved, or













. : ~q v p



















s aiaorithrn is a syntactic proof method, created
by Hao Wang C19703, which produces the same results as
truth tables but requires less computational effort.
It consists of writing down a series of lines, each
simplier than the previous one, until a proof is completed
or it is shown to be impossible to continue. Each line
consists of any number of premises separated by commas on
each side of an arrow.
The rules say the following
1) The initial form is:
premise 1, premise 2, .., premise n -> conclusion.
2) If the principal connective of a premise is a
negation, drop the negation symbol and move the premise to
the other side of the arrow.
3) If the principal connective of a premise on the
left side of the arrow is an "and", or on the right is an
"or", replace it by a comma.
4) If the principal connective of a premise on the
left side of the arrow is an "or", or on the right is an
"and", produce two new lines,
each with one of the two
sub-premises replacing the premise.
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5) If the same premise occurs on both sides of the
arrow, the line is proven.
6) If no connectives remain in a line or no proposi
tional variable occurs on both sides of the arrow, the




















n> -> "q v p
Rule 4 :
a) ~< (m 'sn)
-




n) -> ~q v p




n> -> ~q v p
Applying rule 3 to part b) :




n> -> ~q, p
By rule 5, this
branch is proved, because
"p"
is
on both sides of the arrow.
Applying rule 2 to
part a) :

























Applying rule 5 in bb) it is proved.
Applying rule 3 to aa) , it becomes:





Applying rule 5, the argument is valid.
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3.4 Predicate Calculi .is
Proposit ional calculus deals only with true and false
sentences; there is no reasoning about individual entities
and their properties. For purposes of artificial intelli
gence, this is not very useful because in order to get
knowledge, more than just true and false sentences are
needed. It is also necessary to talk about objects, to
postulate relationships between thern, and to generalize
these relationships over classes of objects. These objec
tives can be accomplished through predicate calculus.
ECl^iE^t EslEiiius is an extension of proposit ional
calculus. The meaning of the logical connectives is
retained, but the focus of the logic is changed. Instead
of looking at the truth value of the sentences, predicate
calculus is used to represent statements about specific
objects or individuals.
Consider the example
All humans are mortal. P
Socrates is human. Q
Socrates is mortal. . : R
This notation appears to be invalid even when the
argument is valid.
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The validity of an argument does not depend upon the
way in which simple statements are compounded but rather
upon the inner logical structure of the non-cornpound
statements involved.
3.4.1 Basic Concepts
A BCgdicate is a statement about individuals, both by
themselves and in relation to other individuals. It has a
value of either true or false depending upon which indivi
dual it is applied to. If the predicate "is
Greek"
is
considered as an example, by applying it in the singular
proposition "Socrates is
Greek,"
it is true, but applied
to "Caesar is Greek,
"
it is false.
Particular entities, such as Socrates, Caesar, etc.
are designated as individuals, and lowei case letters
(excepting x) are used to represent them. Generally, the
first letters of the vocabulary are employed. General






etc. are represented with upper-case letters.
Having two sets of symbols, one
for particular enti
ties or individuals, and the other for attributes of the
individuals, the convention
is adopted of writing an
attribute symbol immediately to the left of the individual







for example, are represented as Hs
and Ms respectively. When reference to no one in particu
lar is required, it is written Hx to represent the attri
bute H(uman) of the individual x, no one in particular,
and so forth. A letter x is a place marker.
The propositions Hs, Ms, etc. are either true or
false, but a proposition using x such as Hx, is neither
true nor false, it is a proposit ional function which con
tains a variable and becomes a proposition when a constant
is substituted for this variable. Prepositional functions
such as Hx, Mx, etc. are called "simple
predicates"
to
distinguish them from the more complex proposit ional func
tions discussed later- A simgie EIZlSiB^ts is a preposi
tional function having some true and some false substitu
tion instances, each of which is a simple proposition.
3.4.2 Quantifiers
Each predicate defines a set or a sort, i.e., for any
predicate P, all individuals X can be sorted in two dis
joint groups, one containing
those objects that satisfy P
(for which P(X) is true), and the other containing those
objects that do not satisfy P. It is very important to be
able to reference both parts and the whole universe of
discourse.
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To deal with this situation, there are two different
quantifiers, the universal (V) and the existential ( 3).
The first one means "For all and the second one
means "There exists... Thus, the general example "All
things are mortal" is represented as (Wx)Mx, and "Some
thing is
mortal,"
as ( 3x)Mx. The universal quantifica
tion of a proposit ional function is true if and only if
all of its substitutions are true. The existential quan
tification of a prepositional function is true if and only
if it has at least one true substitution. Thus, proposi
tions also can be obtained by generalization, placing a
universal or existential quantifier before a variable, and
not only by substituting individual constants for indivi
dual variables.
Propositions such as Mx or Hx can be denied by ""Mx
and ~Hx respectively. The universal proposition "Every
thing is
mortal"
is denied by the proposition "Something
is not mortal.
"
Both equivalences are represented as
~(Wx)Mx == ( 3x)~Mx.













Ux)""Mx == ( 3 x)Mx.





Generalizing the previous relations between quantif
iers
(Ux)^x == CvJx)'v^mx.







where ju represents any simple predicate.
The graphical representation of the relations between
























Two propositions are contraries if they might both be
false but cannot both be true. Two propositions are sub-
contraries if they can both be true but cannot both be
false. When one proposition is true and the other false,
both are contradictories.
Propositions of types A, E, I, and 0, are classified
as universal affirmative, universal negative, particular
affirmative and particular negative respectively.
Consider as an example the following type A proposi
tion "All Humans are
Mortals."
This can be represented
as (Vx) (Hx P Mx). A similar type E proposition says "No
Humans are Mortals,
"
which can be represented as (Vx) (Hx 3
~Mx). Applying the same example
to a similar I type,
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"Some humans are mortal," can be represented as ( 3x)(Hx
y-
M x). Finally, the 0 type proposition says "Some Humans
are not
Mortals,"
which is translated to ( 3x)(Hx
'-
~Mx).
An A type proposition may be true while its
corresponding I type proposition is false. Similarly, an
E proposition may be true while its corresponding 0 propo
sition is false.
3.4.3 Rules of Inference
To construct formal proofs of validity, it is neces
sary to expand the previous list of rules of inference and
equivalence. Four additional rules are required. The
first one is the Universal Instantiation, UI, which dic
tates
UI: (Vx) ( j x)
< . : & w
where <p represents any
simple predicate and w, any indivi
dual symbol.
The second rule is the Universal Generalization, or
UG for short, which
implies
UG: *w
. : (Vx) (fi x)
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The third rule is the Existential Instantiation, EI,
which establishes
EI : ( 3x) ( p x)
. : 4 w
The last rule is the Existential Generalization, EG,
which denotes
EG: $ w
. : ( 3x) ( f x)
As examples of the application of these rules con
sider
I) All Humans are Mortals
Greeks are Humans
Greeks are Mortals.
1) (Vx) (Hx P Mx)
2) (Ux) (Gx 9 Hx)
(Vx) (Gx s Mx)
3) Hw s Mw UI (1)
4) Gw 9 Hw UI (2)
5) Gw Mw Hypothetic Syllogism (4,3)
6) (Vx) (Gx P Mx) UG (5)
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II) All philosophers are Greek
Some mariners are philosophers
Some mariners are Greek.
1) (Vx) (Px p Gx)































To prove the invalidity of an argument, the same
technique of assigning truth values to the variables used
in prepositional calculus can be employed. This method is
based on the general assumption that there is at least one
individual in the quantified class of objects.
If there is exactly one individual, say a, then
(Vx) ( *x) == Pa -- ( 3x)(^x).
If there are exactly two individuals, say a and b, then
(Vx) ( px) -= pa
"
Pb, and ( 3x) ( ? x)
== -C^a v **b>;
and so on.
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Thus, an argument involving quantifiers is valid if
and only if it is valid no matter how many individuals
there are, provided there is at least one.
Hence, the procedure to prove invalidity is the fol
lowing. First, consider a one-element model, writing out
the logically equivalent truth-function argument. If this
argument can be proved invalid by assigning truth values
to its statements, that suffices to prove the invalidity.
If that cannot be done, consider a two-element model based
on the previous equivalences. If the current argument
cannot be proved invalid, continue adding elements.
As an example, consider




: . (Vx) (Ox P Nx)








Assigning T to Ma, Na, and Oa,
the argument is valid. But
considering the









:. (Oa P Na)
'-
(Ob P Nb)
which is proved to be invalid by assigning T to Ma, Na,
Oa, and Ob, and F to Mb and Nb. Hence, the original argu
ment is not valid for a model containing two elements, and
is therefore invalid.
3.4.5 Asyl logistic Inference
All the previous arguments were of a form called
categorical syllogism which consists of two premises and
one conclusion. To evaluate more complicated arguments,
more rules than those already developed are not required.
There are three locutions of natural English that
deserve special attention for the construction of more
complex arguments. The first one can be observed in
statements like "All politicians are either honest or
liars."
Although it contains an
"or"
as connective, it is
not a disjunction. This statement is very different from
"Either all politicians are honest or all politicians are
disjunction.
These statements are represented by
(Vx)-CPx z> (Hx v Lx)> and
(Vx) (Px o Hx) v (Px P Lx) respectively.
The second locution to be observed can be stated in
the following sentence "Socrates and Plato are
Greeks."
This sentence translated to a disjunctive statement
(Vx)-C (Sx v Px) z> Gx>
because Greek is Socrates or Plato but not someone who is
both Socrates and Plato.
The last locution is related with different ways of
representing excepting propositions, such as "All
except. . . . ,
"
"All but. . . ,
"
etc. Consider as an example




(Vx) (Gx s> ~Ix)
--
(Vx) (^Gx o lx)
which is equivalent to
(Vx) (lx == ~Gx)




Before explaining how resolution in predicate cal
culus proves theorems, it is important to know how to
determine the contradiction of two literals. In preposi
tional calculus it is very easy to determine that x and ~x
is a contradiction, but in predicate calculus it is not
simple since the binding of variables is considered.





is not a contradiction.
is not a contradiction.
is a contradiction.
The first three cases are obvious, but in the last
case, ~Hx claims that there is no x for which Hx is true,
and Hs claims that there is an object s for which Hs is
true (Similarly to Hx and ""Hs) .
This method of resolution is similar to the preposi
tional resolution previously discussed; that is, this
method assumes that the negation of the theorem to be
proved is true, and attempts to deduce a contradiction
from that negation and the original premises.
The negation of theorems can be achieved simply by
adding the
negation symbol to the proposition and looking
for its equivalent representation where the quantifier is
not negated or through the square of contradictories, con
traries, etc. previously defined.
Existential quantifiers are eliminated by replacing a
variable for a constant. For example ( Jx) (Mx) is
replaced by Ms, claiming that an x exists by choosing a
particular s to take its place. However, if an existen
tial quantifier is within the range of a universal quan
tifier, that constant must depend on the identity of the
universally quantified variable. Thus, the replacement is
a function of the universally quantified variaole. For
example (Vx)( 3y>(Mxy) is replaced for ( Vx) (Mxf ( x) ) - The
function
"F"
is called a skolern function and f(x), a
skolem expression. Universal quantifiers are simply
dropped. The resulting expressions are called the
quant if ierfree form of the Predicate Calculus language.
As examples consider
a) (Vx) (Hx 3 Mx)
Hs
. : Ms which is trans I area into
b) (Vx) (Mx = Nx)
( 3 x) (Mx
x-
Ox)









1) By dropping quantifier and applying Material
Irnpl icat ion.
2) Dropping quantifier and assigning a value to x.
3) Dropping quantifier, assigning a value to x,
negating the theorem and applying De Morgan's
theorem.
4.0 Alternative Ways to Achieve Common Sense Reasoning
It is not at all clear how to represent common sense
reasoning in a computer. Common sense reasoning differs
from the reasoning achieved through classical logic in the
need to draw conclusions from partial or incomplete
knowledge. In classical logic, a conclusion is not
accepted unless it can be proved according to the rules of
inference. In common sense reasoning, however, conclu
sions without a formal proof are accepted just because
they seem plausible.
The artificial intelligence problem consists of how
to make true thinking machines. Two opposite philosophi
cal points of view seek to solve this problem, a logical
approach and a psychological one.
The logical approach, advocated by McCarthy, consid
ers that the way to solve the A I problem is to design com
puter programs that reason according to mathematical
logic, whether or not that is
the way people think.
In Classical logic, the addition of new axioms never
decreases the set of theorems. The new axioms produce new
theorems, so that the
set of theorems grows monotonical ly




What is needed is a kind of logic with a set of
theorems that may lose members as well as gain them when
new axioms are added. This non-rnonotonic logic that would
be able to adapt itself to an incomplete knowledge. Two
methods of non rnonotonic reasoning are reasoning by cii
cumscript ion, developed by McCarthy, and reasoning by
default. Within the latter method, two sorts of detailed
formalizations have been proposed nonrnonotonic logic,
developed mainly by McDerrnott and Doyle, and logic by
default, developed by Reiter.
The psychological approach, advocated by M. Minsky,
proposes that mathematical logic is almost certainly not
the way the human mind works. Minsky calls his approach
the frame system. The idea is to put large collections of
information into a computer, more information that is ever
required to solve any particular problem, and then for
each particular situation, to define which details are
optional and which are not. A collection of frame defini
tions set the scene for common sense reasoning, but the
importance of the details in a frame can change if there
is a change in purpose or goal. In a sense, then, frame
systems are like logic with one
important difference.
Ordinarily, logic would not say
which pieces of knowledge
are more important than others.
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All efforts to solve the Al problem share two major
obstacles, first to decide what knowledge to represent,
and second, to get answers out of the computer in a rea
sonable time.
The first part of this chapter explains in more
detail the characteristics of reasoning by default, the
second part describes the process of reasoning by cir
cumscription and the third part presents the frame system.
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4. 1 Reasoning by Default
There are two important cases of reasoning by
default: non-monotonic logic developed by D. McDerrnott and
J. Doyle, and default reasoning developed by R. Reiter.
Both formalizations interpret a default, S, as prov
able unless and until S can be disproved. What can be
inferred depends on what inference rules are applicable.
Simultaneously, what inference rules are applicable depend
on what can be inferred. The difficulty with this con
cept, then, is its circularity.
Both approaches also agree in the way they interpret
defaults and in their major theoretical properties, but
they differ in their logical forms.
Non
rnonotonic logic
defines defaults as modal formulas, and default reasoning
defines thern as inference rules.
Non
rnonotonic logical rules are more expressive than
those of the logic of defaults because it is possible to
make statements about defaults in terms of non-monotonic
logic. This is why reasoning by default is not covered in
this thesis. However, some applications of it are
explained in reference to frames (See 4.3.4).
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4.1.1 Non-Monotonic Logic
Traditional logic suffers from the rnonotonicity prob
lem, which is that new axioms or premises newer invalidate
old theorems or conclusions. Non-monotonic logic, on the
other hand, may decrease the set of theorems when new
axioms are added. This kind of logic is important in
modeling the beliefs of active processes which, acting
with incomplete knowledge, must make and revise predic
tions in light of new observations.
Non
rnonotonic logic may be applied to many problems
in Al. Its main advantage over other approaches is that
it factors out problems of resource limitation and allows
a representation of
"consistency"
to appear in any con
text. The notation of consistency is a central concept in
non-monotonic logic.
4.1.2 Monotonic Logic
Monotonic or classical logic has no tools for
describing how to revise a
formal theory to deal with
inconsistencies caused by new information. This is
because the problems of recognizing inconsistencies and of
finding and selecting among
alternate revisions is very
hard. In this contenxt, an axiom is equivalent to a prem
ise, a theorem is equivalent
to a conclusion, and a theory
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is equivalent to a set of axioms.
Classical logic is called monotonic because the
axioms of a theory are always a subset of the axioms of
any extension of the theory. For example, if A and B are






denotes monotonic inferability and q is an axiom. A proof
from A, then, also can serve as a proof from B.
In other words, if an axiom S is a logical conse
quence of any theory B, then S is a logical consequence of
any theory that includes B. If B embodies a set of ini
tial beliefs, the addition of new beliefs cannot lead to
the repudiation of old consequences. Monotonic logic,
therefore, cannot adapt to incomplete knowledge, changing
situations, or the generation of new assumptions during
the process of solving problems.
4.1.3 Basic Characteristics
&!2D_rJ32D22]l|.i lEEiS refers to first -order theories in
which new axioms can invalidate old theorems. It can be
obtained from classical logic using the modality M in the
following inference rule
Infer Mp from the inability
to infer ~p





forms new formulas out of existing formulas. Mp can be
read as "p is consistent with the theory. " As an example
cons i der










is added, then 4) is inconsistent. So, by i ) , 4) is not a
theorem.
4.1.4 t-irst-Order Modal Theory
A first -order mgdai theory is defined as a set of
proper axioms, logical axioms, and inference rules. For
all formulas p, q and r the iggicai axioms are
a) p 9 (q 9 p)
b) (p 9 (q 9 r) ) 9 ( ( p 9 q) 9 <q r ) )
c) (~q 9 ^p) 9 ((~q 9 p) 9 q)
d) Mxp(x) 9 p(t)
e) Vx(p 9 q) 9 (p 9 Wxq)
where p(x) is a formula, t is a constant or a variable
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free from x in p(x), and p(t) denotes the result of sub
stituting t for every free occurrence of x in p(x). All
other axioms are called E!22EeC or non-logical axioms. The
theory with no proper axioms is called the predicate cal
culus. The theory consisting of axioms which are
instances of a), b) and c) only, is called the sentential
calculus. In addition, each theory contains all instances
of various subsets of the following axioms
Al : Lp O p
(Everything provable is true.)
A2: L(pP q) P (Lp sLq)
(Description of the Modus Ponens rule)
A3: (Vv)Lp 9 L(Wv) p
(Description of the Universal General izac ion rule)
A4: Lp3 LLp
(P is provable only if it is provably provable)
A5: Mp=>LMp
(p is unprovable only if it is provably unprovable.
This assertion is true in non-monotonic systems.)
Lp is equivalent to ~M~p and can be read "not p is incon
sistent"
with the theory; v is a variable; and p and q are
formulas. An atgrgig formula, is an expression P(xl,...xn)
where P is a predicate symbol and xl,...xn are terms. A
forrnuia is either an atomic formula, an expression ~p, an
expression p q, an
expression Mp, or an expression (Vv)p,
where v is a variable, and p and q
are formulas.
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The inference rules for this system are








These axioms and inference rules are intended to be a
plausible account of the logic of
"consistency"
which is
supposed to describe provability in itself. It is essen
tial to the concept of provability that something proven
be provable, and this is what Necessitat ion says.
Before making the system
non
rnonotonic, a few more
definitions are needed:
a) Th(A) = -Cp: S I- p>- Th (A) is a set of theorems
of the modal theory with the proper axioms A. Th (A) has
the following properties
i) Ac Th(A).
ii) if A s B, then Th(A) Th (B) .
iii) Th(Th(A) ) = Th(A).
where A and B are theories, i) and ii) together are called
"rnonotonicity,
"
and iii) represents idempotency.
b) AsA(S) = <Mq: q C L and ~q ft S>
- Th(A) where L is
the set of all formulas and S is the
set of formulas for
the theory A, and S c L.
AsA(S) is the set of assumptions
allowed by S in the modal theory
with proper axioms A.
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c) NMA(S) = Th(A u AsA(S)). NMA(S) is the set of
theorems of the modal theory that are derivable from the
proper axioms and assumptions.
fl fixed fiQint of NMA is a set, X, such that X = NM*
(X). Such a fixed point is a set containing A and a large
set of assumptions, AsA(X), such that no assumption Mp in
X is invalidated by ~p being provable from X, and every
other element of X has a proof from the assumptions and
axioms. In other words, a fixed point is a
"belief"
that
does not change, that is consistent.
d) TH(X) = LA(0<X: X= NMA(X)>. TH is the intersec
tion of all fixed points of A, or the whole language L if
there are no fixed points. That is, TH is the set of all
formulas that are in all fixed points.
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A graphical representation of the previous defini







I- i gure 4.1.1
L is the set of all formulas, S the set of formulas
for the theory A. A is the theory in discourse, Th(A),
the set of theorems obtained from S by applying the previ
ous inference rules to A. AsA(S) is the set of assump
tions from the theory A using the set of formulas S. NMA
(S) is the set of theorems obtained from (A u AsA(S)), and
TH(A) is the smallest fixed point of NMA .
The picture expresses the following
A c Th (A)




An application of the elements of
the picture will be
ahown in detail in the next
example.
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set 2 s TH(set 1)
If there are no fixed points, every formula m the
language is provable, but if L is a fixed point, then it
is the only fixed point. Either way, TH(A)
= L, and the
theory is said to be inconsistent.
As an example consider the following list of
"facts"
1) All Birds can fly
2) All penguins cannot fly (Penguins c Birds).
3) Rocky is a bird.
4) Tom is a penguin.
which, when
translated into the language of logic, is
equivalent to the following proper axioms
1) (Vx) (Bird <x)
A
M Can-fly (x) P Can-fly(x))
2) (Vx) (Penguin(x) 9 (Bird(x)
'"
^Can-f ly ( x ) ) )
3) Bird (Rocky)
A ) Pen n u i n ( Torn )
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This theory has one fixed point which contains the axioms
listed above and the following formulas
a ) B i rd ( Torn )
b) ""Can-fly(Tom)
c) M Can-fly (Rocky)
d) Can-fly (Rocky)
a) and b) follow by applying Modus Ponens to 2) and 4), c)
follows because '"'Can-fly (Rocky ) is not a member of the
fixed point, since M Can-fly ( Rocky) is in the fixed point.
Filling in Figure 4.1.1 from this example gives
A: Axioms 1), 2), 3) and 4).
Th(A): Bird(Tom)
"
^Can-f ly (Torn) ,
Obtained by applying Modus Ponens to 2) and 4) ;
~M ""Bird (Rocky) , ~M ""Penguin (Torn) ,
obtained by Necessitat ion.
AsA(S) : - The set of assuptions is empty because
the only candidate, M Can-fly, belongs to L
and
""
Can-fly belongs to S. So the conditions
stated by the definition are not satisfied.
NM
A
( S ) : B i rd ( Torn )
' "'Can- f 1 y < Torn ) .
S: Bird(x), Can-fly(x), Penguin(x), Bird (Rocky),
Penguin (Torn) , ""Can-f ly ( x) .
L: Language of ail formulas.
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4.1.5 Semantics for First-Order Modal Theories
A mgdai iDtergretatign is the algebraic system
<W, alt, D, V>
where
- W is a set of possible worlds.
-
alt is a reflexive relation on W called the "alterna-
t iveness
relation'"
where wl alt w2 means that w2 is possi
ble with respect to wl.
- D is a domain of objects.
- V is a function, (L aug D) x W -> -C0, 1>, which produces
the truth value of every expression in tne language in
every world. L aug D is the language obtained by using
Trm aug D, which is the set of all terms, aug D. Trrn aug
D is the set of all terms obtained by adding D to the set
of constants. Aug stands for "augmented.
"
V has the following constraints
V(~
p, w)
= 1 iff V(p,w) = 0,




V((Vv),p,w) = 1 iff V(subst (d, b, p) , w)
= 1
for all d in Trrn aug D
V(Mp,w) = 1 iff V(p, r)
= 1
for some r such that w alt r
where p, q denote
formulas of the object language,
subst(d,b, p) is the
result of substituting term d for
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variable b in formula p, v is a variable, and w c W.
A modal model of a first order modal theory is a
modal interpretation (W,alt,D,V> such that V(p,w) = 1 for
every proper axiom, p, and every world, w, of the theory.
4.1.6 Semantics of Nonmonotonic Modal theories
Simple modal models are not adequate for non
monotonic systems. Their purpose is to strengthen a logic
by ruling out some of its models, changing the rules of
semantic interpretation so that fewer cases qualify as
making the desired formulas false.
To do this,
"accidentals"
of V with respect to the
theory A are defined as
V ace A = < Mp: p is a statement in L, V(Mp,w)
= 1,
and some model V of A exists, where V (Mp, w) =1= 1>.
The accidentals are the possible statements that do not
have to be.
The most desireable models needed are the noncommit
tal models, those
with as many accidentals as possible. A
noncommittal model V of a theory A is a modal model of A
such that Mp is true in all worlds of V whenever p is true
in any world of any model
of A u acc(^, A). The reason
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that such models are called noncommittal is that they
exclude models with unfounded necessities.
Basically, a Qoncgmmittal [OEdel is one in which as
many things as possible are "possible", where
"possible"
is a "rneta-level" above the first and makes sense if the
totality of models of a theory is contemplated.
4.1.7 A Proof Procedure for the Sentential Calculus
In non-monotonic logic, provability is defined
without reference to proof; although a theorem will have a
proof in any given fixed point of NMA, there is no obvious
way to generate, or to describe each fixed point.
One place to start solving this problem is with the
sentential calculus, which defines a finite sentential
theory as a theory that contains as proper axioms a finite
list of variable-free formulas.
For the classical sentential modal calculus, deciding
the provability of a formula, p, consists of a search for
a model in which p is false, thereby creating a model with
a world in which the proper axioms are true and p is
false, and then exploring the
consequences of the value
assignments. When a disjunction is assigned a true value,
it is necessary to split
the investigation into branches
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with a different disjunct made true in each branch. For
example consider the following formula




The l's and 0' s under the operators label the truth values
of the constituent expresssions, with 1 standing for true
and 0 for false. For this statement to be false, the
antecedent must be true and the consequent must be false.
The complete reasoning is the following.








CC v D> P -CC D>
11 0 0 0 Closed
<C v D> O -CC
'-
D>
110 0 10 0 Open




CC v D> 9 <C
"
D>
0 11 0 0 0 1 Open
CC v D> 9 <C
'-
D>
110 0 0 Closed
The table has been split twice for
a total of four
branches. Two branches are closed, meaning that, some
formula (C in the first branch and
D in the second) is
labeled both 1 and 0, true and false. A branch is closed
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if it has an atomic formula labeled both 1 and 0, other
wise it is open. Two branches are open, meaning that,
there is an exhaustively consistent labeling of formulas.
Thus, this formula is not valid, and by cornpletness, it is
not a theorem.
To handle nonmonotonic logic, the procedure to
search for a noncommittal model must be changed. When a
formula, Lp, is labeled 1 in any world, it is necessary to
create a new table in which p is labeled 0. If this new
table is open, p is not provable, so Lp can be labeled 0,
thereby closing its branch. If Mp is labeled 0, a new
table is created with p labeled 1. If this table is open,
Mp must be labeled 1 in all other tables.
Deciding the labeling of a table for a non-monotonic
case, as open or closed, may
depend on the states of other
table entries, so it is necessary to try all combinations
applied to the table. A labeling is admissible if, after
applying the previous rules,
the table entries labeled
closed have all their branches closed, and the table
entries labeled open have at least one open
branch apiece.
As an example consider




Branch/World 1 Theorem 1 Axiom i Label ings
A0) B0/W0 1 E 1 M C v M D 1 closed 1 closed
I 0 1000001 1
_ __
Al) B0/W0 1 D 1 MCI closed 1 open
1 11 0 0 1 1
A2) B0/W0 1 CI M D 1 open 1 closed
1 11 0 0 1 1
There are two admissible label ings. If Al is labeled
open, then A2 is labeled closed,
because the open label on
Al enables MD to be labeled 1 in all other
A'
s. Simi
larly, A2 may be labeled open and
Al closed. Either way,
A0 is closed, because one
element of MC or MD will be
labeled 1. Therefore, since for both label
ings A0 is
closed, E is a
theorem in this theory. There are two
fixed points, Fl and F. MD, ~C c Fl,
and MC, E e F.
The proof method can be
summarized as follows: to
test provability of a
formula p in a theory with axioms A,
it is necessary to
create a table with one branch contain
ing a world in
which p is labeled
0 and every axiom in A
is labeled 1. The following
rules then can be applied
repeatedly:
a) Truth Functional
Propagation rule: If the label on
a formula implies
labels on its subparts, then label trie
subparts accordingly.
Such label ings apply throughout the
world in which the labeling takes
place.
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b) Possibility Propagation rule: If Mq is labeled 1
in some world, then create a new alternative world in
which q is labeled 1 and every axiom in A is also labeled
1.
c) Necessity Propagation rule: If Mq is labeled 0 in
some world, label q 0 in all alternative worlds.
d) Disjunction Splitting rule: If qo r is labeled 1
in some world, split the branch in which it occurs into
two branches, each a copy of all the worlds, formulas, and
labels of the original branch, except that one branch has
q labeled 0 in that world and the other branch has r
labeled 1 in that world. This rule comes from the
equivalence between (q 9 r) and (~q v r) .
e) Repetition Elimination rule: If all the labelings
in a world are duplicated in a world of which it is an
alternative, delete
it.
f) Consistency Testing rule: If Mq is labeled 0 in
some world, create
a new table with one branch, containing
a world in which ~q is labeled 0 and every axiom in A is
labeled 1. This will be the table for ~q in A.
77
These rules are applied repeatedly until they do not
change anything. Then every possible labeling is tried.
If there is an admissible labeling in which the original
table is labeled open, then the original formula is not a
theorem, otherwise it is a theorem.
This proof procedure works only for the Sentential
Calculus, but it gives important hints that are useful in
constructing a heuristic prover for first-order theories.
An application of nonrnonotonic logic is explained in more
detail in chapter 5.
4.1.8 Conclusions
Classical logic is extended by the inclusion of a
modal symbol M representing
"consistency."
Thus, the foi
rnula Mp is read as an assertion that p is consistent, and
not as an assertion of p. This follows a we 1 1 -developed
tradition of modal logic, and has parallels in the use of
modal
'tense' operators for axiomatizing facts involving
temporal sequences. This extension requires proofs of a
non-constructive fixed point character. In the present
situation is used the notion of fixed point explicitly.
Many researchers have
not liked the idea of studying
logics of this type. They consider it a mistake to inves
tigate the abstract notion of non-monotonic provability,
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since any real program will be constrained by partial
knowledge. The real issue is when does it become reason
able to stop trying to prove something and start acting on
the assumption that it cannot be proved. It is important
to state the fact that non-rnonotonic rules of inference
are rules about changing theories, and not inference rules
within a theory.
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4.2 Reasoning by Circumscription
Circumscription is another type of non-rnonotonic rea
soning, that handles defaults. It is a parsimonious type
of reasoning and can be viewed as the assumption that all
qualifications to a problem have been stated explicitly.
Ciru.mscriEi2Q is a rule of conjecture for jumping
to certain conclusions, so that, those objects that can be
shown to have a certain property, P, by reasoning from
certain facts, A, are all the objects that satisfy P.
More generally, circumscription can be used to conjecture
that the tuples, <x, y, . . z> , that can be shown to satisfy a
relation, P(x,y, ..z), are all the tuples satisfying this
relation. Circumscription is used to restrict a predicate
as much as possible to be compatible with the facts that
are being taken into account. After this, the desired
conclusions may follow from mathematical logic.








that the only entities that
can prevent the flight of
birds are those whose existence follows from the facts at
hand. Such facts could include, for example, birds that
are penguins, ostriches,
maltese falcons, dead, etc. It
then can be reasoned that if Rocky is a bird and he is not
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a member of the predicate "prevented from flying,
"
then
Rocky can fly. The correctness of this reasoning depends
on having "taken into account" all relevant facts when the
circumscription was made.
An important characteristic to consider is the fact
that it is not possible to get a circumscriptive reasoning
capability by adding sentences to an axiornat izat ion or by
adding an ordinary rule of inference to mathematical
logic. This is because the systems of mathematical logic
are monotonic. Thus, non-rnonotonic reasoning is needed.
Circumscription is very useful when it is necessary
to avoid excessive qualification, because it allows con
jectures that no relevant objects exist in certain
categories except those whose existence follows from the
statement of the problem and common sense knowledge.
When the first -order logic of a problem is cii
cumscribed with the common sense facts about a boat cross
ing a river, for example,
it is possible to conclude that
there is no bridge, or helicopter, or other means at hand
to cross the river. It also may be
concluded that all the
requirements needed to use the boat exist, like oars, no
leaks, etc. Thus, the reasoning
is the following. It is
a part of common
knowledge that a boat can be used to
cross a river unless there is something wrong with the
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boat or something else prevents its use. If the facts do
not require that there be something that prevents crossing
the river, circumscription will generate the conjecture
that there is not something that prevents crossing the
river. That is, using circumscription requires that com
mon sense knowledge be expressed in a form that says a
boat can be used to cross rivers unless there is something
that prevents using a boat.
4.2.1 Types of Circumscription
Two types of circumscription have been developed, an
earlier form called domain circumscription, and the form
that will be discussed here, called predicate circumscrip
tion. Briefly, Domain Bircumscrigtign conjectures that
the known entities are all the entities that exist. Predi-
E:sfce circumscriBtign assumes that entities satisfy a given
predicate only if they have to on the basis of a collec
tion of facts.
4.2.1.1 Domain Circumscription
Domain circumscription is also known as minimal
inference, and minimal inference has a semantic counter
part called minimal entailment. A sentence q is minimally
entailed by an axiom A, written A
1=
q, if q is true in
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all minimal models of A, where one model is considered
less than another if they agree in common elements, but
the domain of the larger one contains elements not
included in the domain of the smaller one.
The domain circumscription of A may be expressed as
Axiorn<#>
-
A p Vx #(x).
where Axiom (jfl) is the conjunction of sentences 0(a) for
each constant a and sentences Vx(0(x) 9 0(f(x))) for each
function f and the corresponding sentences for functions
of higher arities,
A^
is the relat ivizat ion of A with
respect to jZf, and is formed by replacing each universal
quantifier (Vx) in A by <Vx0(x>), and each existential




As mentioned above, predicate circumscription says
that a tuple X satisfies the predicate P only if it has
to. The formalization of predicate circumscription is the
following. Let A be a sentence of first-order logic con
taining a predicate symbol, P (xl,
. . . . xn) ,
which will be
written as P(X). A<0> is the
result of replacing all
occurrences of P in A by the predicate expression j6.
Thus, the circumscription of P in
A(P> is the schema
A(0)
'-
VX(0(X)P P(X))P WX(P(X)P jZf(X)>.
S3
This means that the only tuples (X) that satisfy P are
those that have to, assuming the sentence A. The first
conjunct A(0) expresses the assumption that JZl satisfies
the conditions satisfied by P. The second conjunct
(Vx) (Ijp (X)P P (X) ) expresses the assumption that the enti
ties satisfying 0 are a subset of those that satisfy P.
The conclusion of this implication asserts the converse of
the second conjunct, telling that in this case, j2 and P
must coincide.
A I- q means that the sentence q can be obtained by
r
deduction from the result of circumscribing P in A.
I- is
a non-rnonotonic form of inference called circumscriptive
inference.
It turns out that domain circumscription can be sub
sumed
under*
predicate circumscription by relativizing A









Vx (0<x)P all(x>>PVx<all<x>p 0"(x) ).
Circumscription is not deduction in disguise because
every form of
deduction has two properties that cii
cumscription lacks, transitivity and monotonicity. The
first property says that




c. The second property says that if
A I- a and A C B,
then B I- a for deduction, where A and B are sets of
sen-
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tences. Circumscription should be non-rnonotonic since it
is the conjecture that the ways it is known of generating
A'
s are all the ways there are. The next two subsections
describe how to circumscribe conjunctive and disjunctive
sentences respectively.
4. . Circumscription of the Conjunction






meaning that B, W and 6 are colors. The circumscription
of this sentence gives
0(B)AiZf(W)
'0(G)*
Vx (0(x)3is-color x)3Vx ( is-color x0(x))
Assurnrning that
0(x) == (x= Bvx=Wvx= G),
and substituting this sentence into the previous one,
pro-
d uces
Vx ( is-color xP (x=Bvx=Wvx=G))
which says that the only colors are B, W, and G, which are
the colors that the first sentence requires.
Although this example is trivial because the original
sentence to be circumscribed provides no way of generating
new colors from old ones, it shows
that circumscriptive
inference is non-rnonotonic since if is-color A is adjoined
to the original sentence, it will no
longer be able to
infer the resulting sentence.
ai
4. . 3 Circumscription of the Disjunction
As an example consider
is-color W v iscolor B
The circumscription of this sentence gives
(flS(W) v J2(B))
'-
Vx(0(x) pis-color x)3Wx ( is-color xs0(x))
Substituting successively
0(x) == (x= W) and 0(x) == (x=B)
produces respectively
(W= W v W= B)
-" Vx(x= Wsis-color x)?Vx ( is-color xjx= W)
(B= W v B= B)
"- Vx(x= BPis-color x)sMx ( is-color xjx= B)
Simplifying both terms gives
is-color W P Vx ( is-color x P x=W)
is-color B P Vx (is-color x P x=B)
which, when joined
with is-color W v is-color B, yields
Vx ( is-color xP x=W) v Vx ( is-color xP x=B) .
This last sentence asserts that either W
is the only color
or B is the only color.
66
4.2.4 Conclusions
Circumscription is not a non-rnonotonic logic, but
rather a form of non-rnonotonic reasoning augmenting ordi
nary first-order logic which can be used in other formal
isms besides first-order logic. Circumscription does not
affect irrelevant facts taken into account. If such facts
do not contain the predicate symbol being circumscribed,
then they will appear as unchanged conjunct s. Cir
cumscription also may express heuristic situations better
than axioms do.
Issues of proof are not discussed in detail, but the
term of minimal entailment shows a notion of minimality
which plays the same role as that of the fixed point in
non-rnonotonic logic.
The main differences between circumscription and
non-rnonotonic logic are the following. First, cir
cumscription is concerned with minimal models, and non
monotonic logic with arbitrary models. Second, the rea
soning of non-rnonotonic logic
involves models directly,
while the syntactic formulation of circumscription uses
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4.3 Frame System
According to Bartlett C1933, psychological evidence
shows that people use a large and wel 1 -coordinated body of
knowledge from previous experiences to interpret new
situations in their everyday cognitive activity.
Representing knowledge about objects and events to
specific situations is the purpose of Frames.
Frames were originally proposed by Marvin Minsky
C 19753 as a basis for understanding visual perception and
natural-language dialogues, as a means of reasoning, and
as a model for other complex behaviors. The basic idea of
frames comes from the
"schema''
of Bartlett and the "para
digm"
of Kuhn.
Minsky introduced the term
"frame"
to unify and
denote a loose collection of related ideas about knowledge
representation. Frames were put forward as a set of ideas
for the design of a formal language for expressing
knowledge and reasoning. Frame systems, then, are an
alternative to semantic networks or predicate calculus, as
a knowledge representation scheme.
There are two other interpretations for frames, how




representation indicates that to use
frames is to make certain kinds of assumptions about what
38
entities will exist in the world being described. In
other words, to use frames is to assume that a specific
kind of knowledge is to be represented by them. According
to Minsky, visual perception may be facilitated by the
storage of explicit two-dimensional view prototypes and
rotational transformations among thern. This expresses the
idea of what sorts of things a program needs to know,






dictates that frames are a computational device for organ
izing stored representations in computer memory, and also
perhaps a device for organizing the process of retrieval
and inference that manipulate these stored representa
tions. Reference can be made to the computational ease
that pointers offer in a frame system to allow jumping
from one frame to another, facilitating retrieval
opera-
t ions.
4.3.1 The Meaning of Frames
According to Minsky, when a new
situation is encoun
tered, a structure from memory
is selected. This structure
is what constitutes a frame, and is a remembered framework
to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as neces
sary.
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^ fCsme is a data structure or an expression intended
to represent objects or stereotypical situations. It con
sists of a collection of
"slots"
that describe aspects of
the representation. The slots can be filled with other
expressions or fillers which may themselves be frames, or
simple names or identifiers which may be somehow associ
ated with other frames. Slots cannot be filled by a
slot-filler relation, however, because the trees formed by
filling slots with frames recursively would be infinitely
deep.
Associated with each slot are several kinds of infor
mation. Some of this information may be a set of condi
tions that must be met by any filler. Each slot may also
be filled with a default value. Procedural information
may also be associated to particular slots. That is,
some of this information is about how to use the frame,
some is about what is expected to happen, some is about
what to do if expectations are not confirmed, etc. As an










A frame also may be thought of as a network of nodes
and relations. The "top
levels"
of a frame are fixed and
represent things that are always true about the supposed
situation. The lower levels have many terminals called
slots that must be filled by specific instances. Simple
conditions are specified by markers that might require a
terminal assignment to be a person, an object of suffi
cient value, or a pointer to a sub-frarne of a certain







Frames provide a structure within
which new data are
interpreted in terms of concepts acquired
through previous
experience. The organization of this knowledge
facili
tates expectation-driven processing, looking
for things
that are expected based on the context
in which it is
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thought to be. The representational mechanism that makes
possible this kind of reasoning is the slot, the place
where knowledge fits within the larger context created by
the frame. As another example consider.
House Frame :
Kind of: building
Number of rooms: an integer (default= 4)
Number of floors: an integer (default= 1)
Address: any country (default= U.S.)




Number of rooms: 5
Number of floors: 2
Address: Miami, Fl.
Style of construction: mediterranean
Collections of related frames are linked together into
frame systems. The effects of important actions are mil
rored by transformations between the frames of the system.
For visual scene analysis, the different frames of a
system describe the scene from different points of view,
and the transformations between one frame and another
represent the effects of moving from place to place.
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For example, consider the rotation of a cube.
For nonvisual kinds of frames, the transformation?
between frames can represent actions, cause-effect rela





Since different frames of a system may
share the same
terminal slots, it is
possible to coordinate information
gathered from different points of
view. For example con






O D Q Q
The power of the theory hinges on the inclusion of
expectations and other kinds of presumptions. Frame slots
are normally filled with
default assignments which are
attached loosely, so that they can be easily displaced by
new items that better fit current situations. Thus, they
also serve as variables or as special cases
for reasoning.
Frame systems are linked by an information retrieval
network. When a proposed frame cannot fit reality, this
network provides a replacement frame. These inter-frame
structures make possible other ways to represent knowledge
about facts, analogies, and other information useful in
understanding and reasoning. For example, if a simple
chair frame does not fit an object to be represented,
frames of a reclining chair, arm chair, desk chair, etc.
can be tried. In all cases, the several hypotheses that
may be generated when there is a need to change frames
should be weighed according to the cost involved in assum
ing them.
After a frame is proposed to represent a situation, a
matching process tries to assign values to each
frame'
s
slots, that are consistent with the markers at each place.
The matching place is controlled partially by information
associated with the frame, and partially by knowledge
about the system's current goals. The matching process is
discussed in the following section.
4.3.2 Frame Inference
Rules of inference and rules of equivalence,
in clas
sical logic, indicate the
steps to follow to prove the
validity of an argument. However,
there is no rule that
says which of these rules to use
and when to use them.
Inference in frames is not as
complicated as it is in
logic, because a relatively large
amount of information
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may be represented by frames. There are also no rules to
follow, and the inferences are quite evident.
One inference rule is instantiation. Given a frame
representing a concept, generate an instance of the con
cept by filling in its slots.
Another kind of inference is "cr iter ial' inference,
suggested by Minsky C19753 and realized explicitly in some
applications of frames. If all the slots of a frame are
filled, this rule enables the inference that an appropri
ate instance of the concept does indeed exist. For exam
ple, if an entity has four tires, engine, seats, and all
the other slots of the frame called "car", then it must be
a car. An example of the application of this rule can be
found in perceptual reasoning. Suppose a program is used
to recognize solids with occluded details and shadows.
When some shapes are recognized, the program may infer
through frame reasoning, which are solids.
A third form of frame reasoning, often called match
ing, has been proposed by Bobrow and
Winograd C19773. If
an instance of a concept exists, matching might be used to
determine whether it can be plausibly regarded as also
being an instance of another concept.
For example, is it
possible to view John Smith as an accountant,
where John




another frame? This question can be rephrased as "Can an
instance of the Accountant frame be found which matches
John Smith?" The sense of matching here cannot mean a
simple syntactic unification, but must rest, if possible,
on some assumptions about the domain in which the frames
in question express information.
Frame inference has the merit of putting frames,
frame instances and matching assumptions into a common
language with a clear extensional semantics that makes it
quite clear what all these structures mean. The usual
inference rules are clearly correct and are sufficient to
account for most of the required deductive properties of
frames.
4.3.3 Other Representations
One concept behind frames, which seems to have arisen
from the preceding section, is
the idea of seeing one
thing as though it were another,
or of specifying an
object by comparing it to a
known prototype, noting the
similarities and differences.
The simplest interpretation of
this idea is the fil
ling in of new details. Thus, to say
John Smith is a man
tells something about him, but to say






presumably have slots which do not appear in the
"man"
frame, but it would also have a slot to be filled by the
man instance for John Smith, or refer to hirn in some other
way, thereby accessing all his slots.
Another more correct interpretation is that a frame
represents a particular way of looking at an entity. For
example, a man may also be a scientist, and neither of
these is a further specification of the other because each
frame can have slots not possessed by the other. Several
properties may be true of a single entity, and that entity
may be both a man and a scientist.
There is an apparent difficulty, however, in that a
single thing may have apparently contradictory properties,
when seen from different points of view. Thus, a man
viewed as a businessman may be very adept with his
business'
s finances, but may be a fool with his
family's
finances. The different points of view insulate the
parts
of the potential contradiction from one
another.
There are several possible
interpretations for this.
One interpretation is related to
the assertion of dif
ferent properties in two frames;
"skillful for business at
work"
and "skillful for business at
home"
are just dif
ferent notions. Another interpretation
is that the frames
somehow encode an extra parameter;
time or place, for
example.
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There is a third interpretation, however, which is to
view frame systems as a metaphor or analogy, without
asserting their truth. For example, a man may be looked at
as a horse if the speed of his running is being con
sidered. Such a caricature may be useful in reasoning
without being taken to be absolutely true. What it really
means to look at a man as a horse, is that certain propel
ties or characteristics of a man are preserved under the
mapping onto a horse which is defined by the analogy.
Since horses run very fast, a man with
"this"
quality,
under the mapping which defines the analogy, may be plau
sibly regarded as
horse like. The intention of such a
caricature, then, is that some of the properties of the
caricature will be transferred to the caricaturee. The
analogy is correct, or plausible, when these transferred
properties do, in fact, hold for the thing being carica
tured, for instance, when the man runs fast, has long
legs, etc.
In order to express caricatures in logic, there is a
need to define a system for the translation of vocabulary.
This seems to require some syntactic machinery which logic
does not provide, namely the ability
to substitute one
relation symbol for another in an assertion. This "anal
ogy
mapping"
was defined by R. Kling CI 97 13 in the
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following way: Let 0 be the syntactic mapping
"out"
of
the analogy. If >x7(x) is the defining conjunction of the
frame Horse- 1 ikeness, then
Horse- 1 ike(x> == f(x).
where *jf may contain several existent ial ly bound variables.
It then may be said that
Horse- 1 i ke (John) is true only
when jfl(T> holds for John. In other words, the asserted
properties are actually true for John when the relation
names are altered according to the syntactic mapping #.
Therefore, a caricature frame needs to contain a specifi
cation of how its vocabulary should change to fit reality.
With this modification, the rest of the reasoning involved
is first-order.
4.3.4 Defaults
One aspect of frame reasoning which is often con
sidered to lie outside of logic is the idea of a default
value, a value which
is taken to be a slot filler in the
absence of explicit information to the
contrary.
Defaults fall outside first-order reasoning
in the
sense that they cannot express
the assumption of the
default value as a simple first-order
consequence of there
being no contrary information.
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As an example, consider a Surnmei day frame, one of
whose slots is Status, with possible values {sunny, rainy,
cloudy >, and a default of sunny. That is, in the absence
of contrary information, it is assumed that a summer day
is sunny. If the day is rainy, though, the conclusion is
that, contrary to what it was expected, the correct filler
for the status slot is rainy. The state of knowledge has
changed. The previous assumption was reasonable according
to the state of knowledge at that time. Now, if *
represents the state of knowledge, then Status (summer-day)
=
sunny was a reasonable inference from *; that is,
* i-
stat us (summer-day ) = sunny. But when it is known that the
day is rainy, there is a new state of knowledge *1, and *1
I-
status (summer-day) = rainy.
In order for this to be deductively possible, it must
be that *1 may be arrived at from
* not only by adding new
beliefs, but also by removing some
old ones. Moreover,
there is no contradiction between the earlier
belief and
the present one. There was no irrationality
or madness,
only misinformation.
As the example shows, default
assumptions involve an
implicit reference to the whole state
of knowledge at the
time the assumption was generated. Any event
which
changes the state of knowledge is liable, therefore,
to
upset these assumptions. If these references to
knowledge
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states are represented explicitly, then
"default"
reason
ing can be expressed easily in logic.
Experience with manipulating collections of beliefs
should dispel the feeling that all the ways new knowledge
can affect previously held beliefs can be predicted.
There is no theory for this process, but any mechanism,
whether expressed in frames or otherwise, which makes
strong assumptions on weak evidence, needs to have some
method for "unpicking" these assumptions when things go
wrong, or, equivalent ly, some method for controlling the
propagation of inferences from assumptions.
To summarize, a close analysis of what defaults mean
shows that they are connected with the idea of observa
tions; they allow additions of fresh knowledge into a
database. Their role in inference - the drawing of conse
quences of
assumptions is expressible in logic, but their
interaction with observations requires that the role of
the state of the system's own knowledge be made explicit.
This requires not a new logic, but an unusual ontology,
and some new primitive relations. It is necessary to be
able to talk about the system itself, in its own language,




Frames contain information about many aspects of the
objects or situations they describe. This information can
be used as though it had been explicitly observed. They
also contain attributes that must be true of objects that
will be used to fill individual slots.
Frames also can be viewed as complex semantic nets
with the difference that they typically have a great deal
of internal structure designed to make them useful in
specific kinds of problem solving tasks.
The real force of the frame idea is not at the
representational level at all, but rather at the implemen
tation level, that is, a suggestion about how to
organize
large amounts of knowledge needed to perform cognitive
tasks. This constitutes a recent attempt by A I research
ers but much of this work is conjecture,
and there are
differences of opinion among thern.
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5.0 A Truth Maintenance Systi (rn
To choose their actions, reasoning programs must be
able to make assumptions and subsequently revise their
beliefs when discoveries contradict these assumptions.
The Truth Maintenance System (TMS) is a problem solving
subsystem for performing these functions by recording and
maintaining the reasons for program beliefs, and by
recording knowledge about deductions. Such recorded rea
sons are useful in constructing explanations of program
actions and in guiding the course of action of a problem
solver.
TMS of Doyle C19703 is an implemented system that
supports non-rnonotonic reasoning. It serves as a truth
maintaining subsystem available to other reasoning
or
problem solving programs, thus its role is to
maintain
consistency among the
statements generated by another pro
gram, not to generate
inferences by itself. When an
inconsistency is detected, it evokes
its own reasoning
mechanism,
dependency-directed backtracking, to resolve
the inconsistency by altering a minimal set
of beliefs.
Formally, TMS has two basic
responsabi 1 it ies. First,
to maintain a data base of proofs of formulas
generated by
an independent problem solver program. Its goal
is to
avoid the presence of both ~q and Mq in the data
base
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simultaneously. Second, to detect inconsistencies adding
axioms to the theory in order to eliminate them.
The logic underlying TMS is explained in more detail
in 4. 1. 1
5.1 Functional Description
TMS records and maintains arguments for potential
program beliefs which are distinguished from currently
held program beliefs. It works with two aifferent data
structures, nodes, which represent beliefs, and justifica
tions, which represent reasons for beliefs.
A node is a statement or a rule, and is in one of two
states which represents its "support
status."
IN: If it has at least one valid justification
OUT: If it does not have any valid justifications.
Attached to each node is a list of justifications, each of
which represents one way of establishing
the validity of
that node.
Both IN and OUT nodes are kept in the system,
IN
nodes because they represent current beliefs,
and OUT
nodes, so that if the available
information changes, all
the reasoning that was required to
create them will not
have to be repeated.
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The basic actions of TMS are
a) to create new nodes, to which the problem solving
program can attach justifications, (statements of belief).
TMS leaves this manipulation to the problem solving pro
gram.
b) to add or to retract new justifications for a
node, which represents steps in an argument for the belief
represented by the node. An argument step usually
represents the application of some rule or procedure in
the problem solving program.
c) to mark a node as a contradiction, which
represents the inconsistency of any set of beliefs that
enter into an argument for the node.
The problem solving program indicates the incon
sistency of the beliefs
represented by certain currently
believed nodes. This is done by using these nodes in an
argument for a new node, and then marking the
new node as
a contradiction. When this happens, dependency-directed
backtracking analyzes the
argument of the contradiction
node to locate the assumptions occurring in
the argument.
It then makes a record of the inconsistency of
this set of
assumptions, and uses this record
to change one of the
107
assumptions. After this, the contradiction node is no
longer believed. An assumption is a node whose supporting
justification has a nonempty list.
5.2 Justifications
A node may have several justifications, each of which
represents a different reason for believing the node. The
justifications comprise the node's justification set. A
node, then, is believed if and only if at least one of its
justifications is valid.
There are two kinds of justifications in TMS,
reflecting two ways that the validity of a node can depend
on the validity of others nodes.
SupportList justification: (SL (inlist) (outlist))
Conditional-Proof justification: (CP consequent dnriy-
pothesis) <outhypothesis> )
SL-just if icat ions are the most common. An SL-
just if icat ion is valid if and only if each node in its
inlist is IN (the set of beliefs), and each node in its
outlist is OUT (the set of beliefs), that is, an
SL-
justification is a valid reason for belief if and only if
each of the nodes in the inlist is believed and each of
the nodes in the outlist is not believed. A
CP-
just if icat ion is valid if the consequent node is IN
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whenever each node of the inhypothesis is IN and each node
of the outhypothesis is OUT. CP-just if icat ions represent
hypothetical arguments and are more difficult to handle
than SL-just if icat ions. TMS deals with CP-just if icat ions
by attempting to convert them to equivalent SL-
just if icat ions. TMS can easily determine the validity of
a CP-justif icat ion only when the justification's conse
quent and inhypotheses are IN and outhypotheses are OUT.
An SL-just if icat ion says that the justified node
depends on each node in a set of other nodes and adds the
dependencies of the referred nodes to the supporting
lists. A CP-just if icat ion says that the node it justifies
depends on the validity of a certain hypothetical argument
and subtracts the dependencies of some nodes from the
dependencies of others. SL-j ust if icat ions with nonempty
inlists and empty out lists represent normal
deductions.
As an example consider
1) It is midnight (SL ( > < >)
2) The stars shine (SL <1> ( ))
A node like 1) with an empty inlist and
outlist is
referred to as a premise because it does not depend
on the
current belief, or lack of belief, in any
other nodes.
The inlist of the SL-just i f icat ion of 2) contains nooe 1,
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indicating that the chain of reasoning that led to the
conclusion that node 2) is to be believed depends on a
current belief in node 1.
The reasoning of TMS appears very similar to that of
a predicate logic system except that it can handle the
retraction of premises and make appropriate changes to the
rest of the database. Now, if the outlist of an SL-
justif ication is not empty, it can also handle default
reasoning as is shown here
1) It is midnight (SL ( > < >)
2) The stars shine (SL <1> (3> )
3) The sun shines
Node 2) is IN if node 1) is IN and if node 3) is OUT.
If, at some future time, evidence appears that 3) is valid
providing justification for it, TMS will make node 2; OUT
since it no longer has a valid justification. Nodes such
as 2) are called assumptions because they are IN on an
SL-just i f icat ion with a nonempty outlist.
TMS does not create justifications itself. The jus
tification for node 2) comes from the domain knowledge in
the problem solving program.
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5.3 The Truth Maintenance Process
The truth maintenance process updates the current set
of beliefs when the user adds to or subtracts from the
justification-set of a node. Since retracting justifica
tions does not present any real problems, only additions
to the set of beliefs will be covered here.
The truth maintenance process starts when a new jus
tification is added to a node. Minor updating is required
if the justification is invalid or if it is valid but the
node is already IN. If the justification is valid and the
node is OUT, the node and its repercutions must be
updated. TMS makes a list containing the justification
and its repercutions, and marks each of these nodes
to
indicate that they have not been given well founded sup
port .





support statuses of the nodes. An "affected
cgnseguence"
is a consequence of a node which
contains that node in its




closure of the affected consequences of
the node.
TMS then examines the justifications
of these nodes
to see if any are valid on
the basis of unmarked nodes.
If it finds any valid nodes, they are
made IN. Nodes are
made OUT if all their justifications are invalid.
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The marked consequences of the nodes then are exam
ined to see if they too can be given well founded support
(non-circular proofs). Sometimes well founded support
statuses are found for all nodes. At other times, some
nodes remain marked due to circularities. A
"cgnseguence"
is a node which mentions the node in one of the justifica
tions in its justification set.
After the consequences have been examined, TMS ini
tiates a constraint-relaxation process which assigns sup
port statuses to the remaining nodes. Finally, TMS checks
for contradictions and CP-just if icat ions, performs
dependencydirected backtracking and CP-just i f icat ions
process if necessary, and signals the user program of the
changes in support statuses of the nodes involved in truth
maintenance.
There are two types of inconsistencies handled by
TMS. The first type deals with both Mp and ""p being IN,
and the second type deals with both p and ~p being IN.
In the first case, when a new justification is
discovered for some formula which then invalidates some
current assumptions,
- TMS must reexamine the current
labeling to find a new labeling
consonant with the
enlarged set of justifications. This process takes on the
appearance of a relaxation procedure for finding an
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acceptable labeling, and then determining non-circular
proofs for all valid formulas. The second type of incon
sistency requires somewhat different process. TMS must
traverse justifications, seeking the assumptions underly
ing the conflict formulas. To resolve the inconsistency
of these assumptions, TMS converts the problem to one of
the first type by producing a new justification for the
denial of one of the assumptions in terms of the other
assumptions. TMS cannot rule out an assumption Mp by
deriving ^Mp, but instead it produces a derivation of ~p.
This process is called dependency-directed backtracking.
In non-rnonotonic logic there is also another kind of
inconsistency, that due to there being no fixed point at
all. TMS can loop forever when presented a theory of tnis
sort. Normally this does not happen.
5.4 Dependency-Directed Backtracking
When TMS makes a contradiction node IN, it invokes
dependency-directed backtracking to find and remove at
least one of the current assumptions in
order to make the
contradiction node OUT. The steps of this
process are
a) Search the maximal assumptions: Trace through the
foundations of the contradiction node C to find the set
S=
CA1, . ftr.>, that contains an assumption A if and only if
A
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is in C's foundations and there is no other assumption B
in the foundations of C such that A is in the foundations
of B.
b) Summarize the cause of inconsistency: If no pre
vious backtracking attempt on C discovered S to be the set
of maximal assumptions, create a new node, NG, called
'no-good', to represent the inconsistency of S. If S was
encountered earlier as a no-good set of a contradiction,
use the previously created no-good node.
c) Select or reject a culprit: Select some Ai, tne
culprit, from S. Let Dl,..Dk be the OUT nodes in the
outlist of Ai's supporting-justifications. Select Dj from
this set and justify it with
(SL (NG Al, . . . Ai-1, Ai + 1, . . . An> <D1, . . . Dj-1 , Dj + 1 . . . Dk> )
This step recalls reduction ad absurdurn if the D nodes are
taken as denials of the selected assumption.
d) Repeat if necessary: If TMS finds other arguments
so that the contradiction node C remains IN after the
addition of the new justification from Dj , repeat the pro
cess. Finally, if the contradiction becomes OUT, then
halt, or if no assumption can be found in C's foundations,
notify the problem solving program
of an unanalyzable con
tradiction and halt.
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5. 5 An Example
As an example consider a program scheduling a meet
ing, to be held at noon in either room 101 or 106
node 1: t irne (meet ing) = 100 <SL( > <2> )
node 2: time (meet ing) = 1200
node 3: room (meet ing) = 101 (SL( > <4> )
node 4: room (meet ing) = 106
TMS makes nodes 1 and 3 IN and nodes 2 and 4 OUT.
Supposing that new knowledge is acquired, and that it is
not possible to hold the meeting at that time, in that
room:
node 5: contradiction (SL<1,3> ( >)
The dependencydirected backtracking system traces
the foundations of node 5 to find two assumptions, nodes 1
and 3, both maximal :
node 6: nogood 1,3 (CP 5 <1,3> ( >)
node 4: room (meet ing) = 106 (3L(6, 1> ( >)
The backtracker justifies node 3 which means
""
(time (meet ing) = 1200
'-
room (meet ing ) = 106 ). It arbi




OUT antecedent, node 4. Then TMS makes nodes 1, 4,
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and 6 IN, and nodes 2, 3 and 5 OUT. Node 6 has a
CP-
justification equivalent to a premise SL-just if icat ion,
since node 5 depends directly on the two assumptions,
nodes 1 and 3, without any additional intervening nodes.
A further rule determines that room 106 will not be
used, and creates another contradiction node to force a
different choice of room:
node 7: contradiction (SL(4) ( >)
node 8: no-good 1 (CP 7 (1> < >)
node 2: time (meet ing) = 1200 (SL (8> ( ))
Tracing backwards from node 7 through nodes 4,
3 and
1, the backtracker finds that
the contradiction depends on
only one assumption,
node 1. It creates the no-good node
3, justifies it with
a CP-just if icat ion. The loss of
belief in node 1 carried nooe 5 away too.
TMS makes nodes
2, 3, 5 and 8 IN, and
nodes 1, 4, 8 and 7 OUT.
5.6 Conclusions
TMS solves part of the
belief problem, and provides a
mechanism for making
non-rnonotonic assumptions. The non
monotonic capabilities of
TMS can be viewed as capabili
ties for dealing with incomplete
knowledge.
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TMS revises opinions rather than beliefs. Choosing
what to "believe" in TMS, involves making judgements. A
single new piece of information may lead to considerable
changes in the set of opinions, where new beliefs cnange
old ones only slightly.
TMS is a formal system of constraints among objects
representing theorems of a first-order theory. The infei
ence rules of the logic can be used to generate new con
straints having the form "if x is believed, then y must be
believed."
At any moment, TMS will have a finite set of
theorems and constraints. It then can implement the non
monotonic inference "if p is consistent, then
q"
since
consistency is judged with respect to the current set of
theorems, not with respect to everything provable from it.
The addition of a new constraint may make a previous con
sistent judgement invalid, thus demanding readjustment of
the entire set of beliefs. The goal in building TMS is to
make this process consistent and computationally feasible.
The algorithms for testing consistency are complex because
they include non-rnonotonic rules as well as first-order
theorems.
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6 . 0 Cone 1 us icms
First-order logic lacks an explicit scheme to index
into relevant knowledge. It is unable to handle changing
or incomplete kno ledge and has limitations in deductive
inference. However, logic has a formal precision and a
clear interpretabi 1 ity.
Non-rnonotonic logic and circumscription offer a
better way to deal with inconsistencies caused by
adquisi-
tion of new knowledge. The real problem in this system is
the complexity found in the design and in the implementa
tion of such systems.
None of the two previous non-rnonotonic reasoning
methods deals with the problem of revision of belief.
This problem is resolved in TMS, in which each statement
has an associated set of justifications that are used to
determine the current set of
'beliefs.' When it changes,





The word frame has been applied to
a variety of
slot-and-f iller representation structures, mostly
follow
ing the ideas presented by
M. Minsky. A frame is a
general-purpose structure to represent things
and stereo
typed situations. A frame also can be viewed
as a complex
semantic net which has a great deal of internal structure
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designed to make it useful in representing knowledge and
problem-solving tasks. One of its outstandings charac
teristics is that it offers many relevant facts about the
represent at ion.
There are, however, other "knowledge-structures" such
as 'scripts' which are not discussed here because they are
special-purpose structures that describe a stereotyped
sequence of events in a particular context. Other
knowledge-structures is 'semantic nets' and 'conceptual
dependency'
.
All these structures are very useful because they
provide a way to represent information and means or rea
soning.
After reviewing these approaches there is no doubt
that with them certain kinds of common sense reasoning are
achievable, mainly when related with the generation of





Minimization of Boolean Functions
It is understood by minimization of a Boolean func
tion, the process of finding the sirnpliest equivalent
expression to the function, that is, the sirnpliest sum of
products.
Simplification can be done algebraically utilizing
the absorption laws and similar relations. But problems
arise with the doubt of having not taken into account all
possible ways of applying the simplification rules. To
avoid this, two methods are discussed, wnich were designed
by Karnaugh and Quine respectively.
Karnaugh Method of Minimization
This is a graphic method which consists of represent
ing each element of the function as an entry in tne taole
or map. Simplification then, comes easily. This method
works well with four variables or less.
It is assumed a number one to the occurrence of a
variable and a zero otherwise. For example,:
xy' = 10;
w' xy' = 010, etc. Following the previous notation,
the maps





00 01 11 10
00
121
1 001 01 1 111 10
001 I | |
011 1 1 I
HI 1 1 i
101 1 1 1
Each square contains either a 1 , if the term
represented is required to be present, or a 0 (or blank)
if it is required to be absent, or
"X"
if its presence or
absence does not care.
The method consists in covering all l's with the
least number of rectangles. Adopting the previous nota




F(w, x, y, z) : w' x' y' z' + w'xy'z' + w' xy' z +
wxy' z' + wxy z + wxyz + wx'y:
i 001 011 Hi 10
001 1 1 1 1
011 1111 1
111 11 1 i 11
101 1 111
a) WXYZ









C) w X Y z
0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0




F(w, x,y, z) :
w' y' + wyz
xy'
12;
Quine McCluskey Method of Minimizati on
The following method was originated by Willard van
Qrman Quine and modified by E. J. McCluskey.
The method has two different procedures, the first
one is applied to get prime irnplicants and the second one
to eliminate redundant prime irnplicants.
The first procedure is a simplification of products
based on an application of the distributive law: Ex +
Ex'= E(x+x')= E(l)= E, where E is a Boolean expression.
Quine'
s method consists of expressing a function as a set
of rninterms or sum of products; finding a set of prime
irnplicants (products that cannot be reduced), tnat is,
beginning with the full disjunctive form (ail elements of
the function are connected by an
"or"
or by "+"), forming
all possible combinations. The procedure is repeated
until the prime irnplicants are reached. the result is the
sum of the irnplicants.
McCluskey modified this method changing the
Quine'
s
algebraic description of terms for a numeric one, using
the binary numbers. Thus, the process becomes easier.
Example:
F(w,x,y,z): w' x' y' z' + w'xy'z' +
w'xy':" +
wxy' z'
+ wxy' z + wxyz + wx'yz
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0 0 0 0 w' x' y' z'
0100 w'xyz
0 10 1 w' x y' z




which, at the same time, are grouped according to the
number of l's that they have.
Comparing these terms, the following combinations are
produced :













Comparing adjacent groups again, a new prime impii-
cant is produced: - 1 0 - Now the function becomes:




The second part is a table that eliminates the redun
dant prime irnplicants. The table shows terms in disjunc
tive normal form versus prime irnplicants; a cross is
placed in position (G, U), if the Gth term participates in
the formation of the Uth prime irnplicant.
If a column contains a single cross, tne prime irnpli
cant in whose row the cross occurs, is needed to represent
that term. The prime irnplicant is marked and its row and
column deleted. If the method exhausts all columns, the
function is represented by the sum of prime irnplicants
marked. However, if columns still remain, more prime
irnplicants are marked, continuing with the process.






The number 2 means the participating elements
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